In many information-theoretic communication problems, adding an input cost constraint to the operational setup amounts to restricting the optimization domain in the capacity formula. This paper shows that, in contrast to common belief, such a simple modification does not hold for the cost-constrained (CC) wiretap channel (WTC). The secrecycapacity of the discrete memoryless (DM) WTC without cost constraints is described by a single auxiliary random variable. For the CC DM-WTC, however, we show that two auxiliaries are necessary to achieve capacity. Specifically, we first derive the secrecy-capacity formula, proving the direct part via superposition coding. Then, we provide an example of a CC DM-WTC whose secrecy-capacity cannot be achieved using a single auxiliary. This establishes the fundamental role of superposition coding over CC WTCs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security (PLS), rooted in information-theoretic principles, dates back to Wyner's landmark 1975 paper [1] , where the wiretap channel (WTC) was introduced. This model formulates reliable and secure communication over noisy channels in the presence of an eavesdropper (see Fig. 1 ). By harnessing randomness from the noisy channel and combining it with proper physical layer coding, Wyner characterized the fundamental limit of reliable and secure communication, termed the secrecy-capacity. For a memoryless WTC P Y,Z|X , the secrecy-capacity is [2] C WTC (P Y,Z|X ) = max
where the joint distribution is P V,X P Y,Z|X (i.e., V − X − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain) and V is an auxiliary random variable. As PLS guarantees protection against computationally-unbounded adversaries without using shared
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In practice, transmitted signals are often bound to cost (e.g., power) constraints. Therefore, various communication scenarios originally explored without such constraints were later adapted to the CC case. This includes point-topoint channels [51, Chapter 7] , the GP channel [48] and the multiple-access channel [52, Problem 4.8] , to name a few. For all these aforementioned settings, the capacity under a CC is given by the same expression as in the unconstrained case, but with an added restriction on the optimization domain. As will be shown herein, such a simple adaptation of (1) to the CC case is not valid for the WTC.
B. Contributions
We consider a discrete and memoryless (DM) WTC with an input cost constraint and establish a single-letter characterization of its secrecy-capacity. In contrast to (1) , our characterization uses two auxiliary random variables.
We consider all three aforementioned security metrics, that is, weak-secrecy, strong-secrecy and semantic-security, and show that the secrecy-capacity is the same for them all. This is done by proving achievability under semanticsecurity (strongest among the three), while establishing the converse with respect to weak-secrecy.
The achievability proof uses a superposition wiretap code that carries the entire confidential message in its outer layer. The inner layer encodes only random bits purposed to confuse the eavesdropper. The cost, reliability and security analyses rely on standard random coding arguments. However, due to the presence of a positive cost constraint, the expected value analysis (over the codebook ensemble) does not automatically imply the existence of a deterministic codes sequence with the desired performance. We resolve this issue via a novel two-step expurgation technique that first prunes 'bad' codebooks, and only then disposes of 'bad' messages. A careful analysis shows that the inflicted rate loss is negligible, giving rise to a deterministic codebook that satisfies the desired cost, reliability and security requirements.
We then turn to show that two-auxiliaries are necessary to achieve the CC WTC secrecy-capacity. This is done by constructing an example for which superposition coding attains a strictly higher secrecy rate than standard wiretap coding. The necessity of two auxiliaries can be understood by viewing the inner layer auxiliary as a "timesharing" variable that leaks no information about the message to the eavesdropper. In a time-shared scheme, the cost constraint needs to be satisfied only on average (over the participating schemes). Thus, individual schemes could possibly violate the cost constraint, and indeed, it may be beneficial to consider such schemes for achieving higher secrecy rates. In particular, such a situation could occur if the mutual information term
from the secrecy-capacity expression from (1) is a convex function over the CC optimization domain.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides preliminary definitions and sets up the operational problem. The main results are stated and discussed in Section III, while their proofs are furnished in Section IV. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP

A. Notation
We use the following notation. N, R and R ≥0 denotes the set of natural numbers, real numbers and non-negative real numbers, respectively. For a, b ∈ R ≥0 , [a : b] := {n ∈ N : a ≤ n ≤ b}. Calligraphic letters, e.g., X , denote sets while |X | stands for its cardinality. For n ∈ N, X n denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of X , and
x n = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) denotes an element of X n . Whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, bold-face letters denotes vectors or sequences, e.g., x for x n . For i, j ∈ N such that i ≤ j, x j i := (x i , x i+1 , · · · , x j ); the subscript is omitted when i = 1.
Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space, where Ω, F and P are the sample space, σ-algebra and probability measure, respectively. Random variables over (Ω, F, P) are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X, with similar conventions as above for random vectors. We use 1 A for the indicator function of A ∈ F. The set of all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set X (always endowed with the power set σ-algebra) is denoted by P(X ).
The joint PMF of two discrete random variables X and Y on (Ω, F, P) is denoted by P X,Y ; the corresponding marginals are P X and P Y . The conditional PMF of X given Y is represented by P X|Y . Expressions such as P X,Y = P X P Y |X are to be understood as pointwise equality, i.e., P X,Y (x, y) = P X (x)P Y |X (y|x), for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. When the joint distribution of a triple (X, Y, Z) factors as P X,Y,Z = P X,Y P Z|Y , these variable form a
Markov chain X − Y − Z. When X and Y are statistically independent, we write X ⊥ ⊥ Y . If the entries of X n are drawn in an independent and identically distributed (
for P Y n |X n . The conditional product PMF given a fixed x n ∈ X n is designated by P ⊗n Y |X (·|x n ). For a discrete measurable space (X , F), the probability measure induced by a PMF P ∈ P(X ) is denoted by P P ; namely P P (A) = x∈A P (x), for all A ∈ F. The corresponding expectation is designated by E P . Similarly, mutual information and entropy with an underlying PMF P are denoted as I P and H P , respectively. When the PMF is clear from the context, the subscript is omitted. We use T (n) δ (P ) to denote the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with respect to a PMF P ∈ P(X ) and a non-negative δ:
where ν x (x) := 1 n n i=1 1 {xi=x} is the empirical PMF of sequence x ∈ X n . Finally, for a countable sample space X and PMFs P, Q ∈ P(X ), the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between P and Q is
and the total variation is
Encoder Decoder Definition 1 (Code). An (n, R)-code c n for a CC WTC (X , Y, Z, P Y,Z|X , C, b) with a message set M n is a pair of functions (f n , g n ) such that 1) f n : M n → P(X n ) is a stochastic encoder that satisfies the per-message cost constraint given by
where, X(m) ∼ f n (·|m), and C n (x) := 1 n n i=1 C(x i ), ∀ x ∈ X n , is the n-fold extension of C; 2) g n : Y n → M n is the decoding function.
Remark 2 (Minimal cost). The per-message constraint in (5) can be satisfied only if b ≥ c min := min{C(x) : x ∈ X }. Henceforth, we will assume this condition holds without further mention.
A message PMF P M ∈ P(M n ) and a code c n = (f n , g n ) induces a PMF on M n × X n × Y n × Z n × M n given by
The performance of c n is evaluated in terms of the maximal decoding error probability and a chosen security metric. 
whereP M denotes the uniform distribution on M n .
Definition 5 (Achievability). A rate R ≥ 0 is said to be achievable with semantic-security for a CC WTC
if for every > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an (n, R)-code c n such that (5) is
Achievability w.r.t. the weak-or strong-secrecy metrics is defined by replacing sem with weak or str , respectively. 
III. MAIN RESULTS
We give a single-letter characterization of the weak-secrecy, strong-secrecy and semantic-security capacities of the CC WTC, all of which are shown to be equal. The characterization involves two auxiliary random variables.
Both auxiliaries are necessary to achieve capacity in general. We first state the capacity result, and then provide an example for which any single-auxiliary scheme is suboptimal.
A. Secrecy-capacity results
Let U and V be finite sets, and for any P U,V,X ∈ P(U × V × X ), set
where the mutual information terms are taken w.r.t. P = P U,V,X P Y,Z|X . Also, let
and defineC
Our main result is given next. For simplicity of presentation, we will suppress P Y,Z|X and C from the nota-
Theorem 7 (Secrecy-capacity). The secrecy-capacity of a CC WTC (X , Y, Z, P Y,Z|X , C, b) under weak-secrecy, strong-secrecy and semantic-security is the same, and is given by
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Section IV-A. The achievability of (15) relies on a superposition wiretap coding, while the converse adapts the classic WTC converse to accommodate the cost constraint. We note that the CC WTC's secrecy-capacity expression involves two auxiliary random variables U and V . In contrast, the secrecycapacity formula of a WTC (without a cost constraint), given in (1), uses only a single auxiliary. In Section III-B
we show that a reduction ofC(b) to a single auxiliary is impossible, in general.
The following lemma provides additional properties ofC(b). These properties are used in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 8 (Structural properties). In the definition ofC(b) in (14), it suffices to consider auxiliary alphabets U and V with |U| ≤ |X | and |V| ≤ |X | 2 . Moreover,C(b) is a non-decreasing and concave (for b ≥ c min ) function of b, and the supremum in (14) is achieved, i.e.,
The proof of Lemma 8 is provided in Appendix A for completeness.
B. Two Auxiliaries are Necessary
Comparing (1) and (16), one might ask whether a reduction to a single auxiliary random variable in Theorem 7 is possible. We show that the answer is negative in general. To this end, we provide an example of a CC WTC
where the mutual information terms on the right hand side (RHS) are w.r.t. P V,X P Y,Z|X . To explain briefly, the example incorporates a WTC setup in which the transmitter (encoder) is connected to the receiver (decoder) via a noiseless private data link. The transmitter can choose the content as well as timing of the transmission, however, it is constrained to use the link atmost half of the time. The receiver observes the data (error-free) when transmission occurs, and random noise otherwise. On the other hand, the eavesdropper has no access to the data link, but perfectly knows the timing of the transmission. We next describe the details of the WTC setup.
Consider the (X , Y, Z, P Y,Z|X , C, b) CC WTC shown in Fig. 2 that is defined as follows: 
• The channel input is X = (X,Z) ∼ PX ,Z , whereX andZ take values inX and Z, respectively, and both are controlled by the encoder.
• Consider the cost function C(x) = C(x,z) =z, for all x = (x,z) ∈X × Z, and set the cost constraint to b = 0.5. Thus, the input must satisfy
Let P Y |X = P Y |X,Z denote the transition kernel from X to Y induced by the above relation.
We have the following proposition whose proof is given in Section IV-B.
Proposition 9. For the (X , Y, Z, P Y,Z|X , C, 0.5) CC WTC described above,
For proving Proposition 9, we choose a P U,V,X ∈ H(0.5) such that I P (V ; Y |U ) − I P (V ; Z|U ) = 0.5, thus establishingC(0.5) ≥ 0.5. This is done by selecting U =Z ∼ Ber(0.5),X ∼ Ber(0.5) ⊥ ⊥Z, and V = X := (X,Z). Intuitively, such a choice of auxiliaries correspond to a communication scheme of transmitting data half of the time (say, every alternate channel use). Subsequently, we show that the RHS of (18) is strictly below 0.5. This is shown by starting with the assumption that there exists a P V,X such that E P [C(X)] ≤ 0.5 and
, and then arguing that it leads to a contradiction.
Achieving the CC WTC secrecy-capacity in the above example requires two auxiliary random variables. While a reduction in the number of auxiliaries is impossible in general, we next show that no auxiliaries are needed when the WTC is less noisy. Namely, the condition is that Y is less noisy than Z, i.e., I P (U ; Y ) ≥ I P (U ; Z), for all P U,X,Y,Z = P U,X P Y,Z|X [53] . This is similar to the state of affairs for WTC without a cost constraint [2] .
Corollary 10. If Y is less noisy than Z, then
If Z is less noisy than Y , thenC(b) = 0.
The proof of Corollary 10 is provided in Section IV-C.
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 7
We will show that C weak (b) ≤C(b) and C sem (b) ≥C(b) for any b ≥ 0. This combined with the fact that
will imply the desired result.
1) Converse:
Recall thatP M denotes the uniform distribution on M n . It suffices to show that for any δ > 0, a rate R achievable under the weak-secrecy metric satisfies R ≤C(b) + δ, for large enough n. Fix > 0 and let c n be an (n, R)-code with max e(c n ), weak (c n ) ≤ . Any such code must also satisfy the weaker constraint max EP M e M (c n ) , 1 n (P M , c n ) ≤ . Accordingly, we may assume without loss of generality that P M =P M . From Fano's inequality [54] , it follows that
Now, we can write
where (a) follows from (20);
(c) and (d) use the Csiszár-sum identity [52] ;
(e) is due to the auxiliary random variable identification (g) is due to the concavity ofC(·) proved in Lemma 8;
(h) is becauseC(·) is non-decreasing and X n satisfies E 1 n n i=1 C(X i ) ≤ b due to (5) .
Thus,
The claim follows by taking n sufficiently large and > 0 small enough.
2) Achievability: By the continuity 3 ofC(b), it suffices to show that for any > 0, there exists an (n, R) code c n that satisfies (11) , provided that R <C(b) and n is sufficiently large. To this end, we construct an ensemble of superposition wiretap codes and show that the expected (over the ensemble) cost, error probability and semanticsecurity metric satisfy average versions of the constraints. Then, through a sequence of codebook and message expurgation steps, we show the existence of a code c n that satisfies (5) and (11), as required.
Fix > 0 and a joint PMF P U,V,X,Y,Z :
Codebook B n : We use a superposition codebook such that the inner layer adds redundancy to confuse the eavesdropper, while the outer layer carries the information about the message.
Define the index sets I n := [1 : 2 nR1 ] and J n := [1 : 2 nR2 ]. Let B (n) U := {U(i), i ∈ I n } be a random inner layer codebook such that each codeword U(i), i ∈ I n , is a sequence of length n generated independently according to Denoting the set of all possible values of B n by B n , the codebook construction described above induces a PMF µ ∈ P(B n ), given by
Encoder f n : Given a codebook B n and message M = m, the encoder chooses an index pair (i, j) uniformly at random from the set I n × J n , and transmits X ∼ P ⊗n X|V · v(i, j, m) . The induced encoding function f n : M n → P(X n ) is given
Decoder g n : Upon observing y ∈ Y n , the decoder looks for a unique tuple î ,ĵ,m ∈ I n × J n × M n such that
If such a unique tuple exists, the decoder sets g n (y) =m;
else, g n (y) = 1.
Induced distribution: Denote the pair (f n , g n ) w.r.t. the codebook B n by c n (B n ). For a given codebook B n , M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,M , respectively. We will also denote the probability measure induced by P (Bn) and P (Bn) by P P (Bn ) and P P (Bn) , respectively. Note that P (Bn) is a random PMF and P P (Bn ) is a random probability measure.
Cost Analysis: We analyze the expectation (w.r.t. the random codebook) of the cost averaged over messages.
For any m ∈ M n , note that E µ P (Bn) X|M (x|m) = P ⊗n X (x), ∀ x ∈ X n , which readily implies that
It follows that for some γ > 0 and all n ∈ N,
Average error probability analysis: We analyze the expected error probability averaged over messages. For any B n ∈ B n and (i, j, m) ∈ I n × J n × M n , let Y ∼ P (Bn) Y|I,J,M (·|i, j, m), and define the following error events:
Due to the symmetry of the random codebook B n , encoder f n and decoder g n , the expected error probability over B n , i.e., E µ P P (Bn ) (M = M ) , is the same for any realization of (I, J, M ). Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that (I, J, M ) = (1, 1, 1). We have
To upper bound the the RHS of (24), we use the following lemma whose proof is given in Appendix B.
then there exists a ζ(δ) > 0 such that
Thus, from (24) and (27), it follows that
provided (25) and (26) 
where, 
where P (min)
Thus, showing that there exist B n ∈ B n and γ 1 > 0 such that max m∈Mn θ(m, B n ) ≤ e −nγ1 for large enough n, is sufficient (by (30) and (31) The existence of such a B n is implied by the following lemma. The lemma restates the outcome of the secrecy analysis from [13] , providing a double-exponential bound on the probability of an exponentially small deviation of max m∈Mn θ(m, B n ) from zero.
Lemma 12 ( Lemma 4 from [13] ). If
then there exists γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n,
Lemma 12 follows from the proof of Lemma 4 in [13] , which is a stronger version of the superposition softcovering lemma [55] . The double-exponential bound in (33) is an implication of Chernoff bound applied to the collection of an exponential number of i.i.d. codewords in the random superposition codebook.
Summary of random coding argument: Combining (23), (28) and (33), we have shown that
provided (25), (26) and (32) holds.
We next perform a sequence of expurgation steps: first, w.r.t. codebooks and then w.r.t. messages. At the end of this process, we deduce the existence of a single codebook B n that satisfies (5) and (11) . Note that the selection lemma of [56] or [13] is not applicable here as the RHS of (34a) is a constant which does not vanish to zero as required by the lemma.
Expurgation: For any B n ⊆ B n , letμ
be the probability measure on B n induced by µ. Our expurgation technique on the codebooks B n ∈ B n is performed for each fixed n (sufficiently large) as described in the following steps:
1) Codebook expurgation to satisfy average (over messages) cost:
Expurgate codebooks B n ∈ B n with the highest cost E P (Bn ) X C n (X) to obtain a set B n ⊂ B n such that 1 n+2 ≤μ(B n ) < 1 n+1 . This is possible for large n since each codebook B n has exponentially small probability. We now show that all the codebooks B n ∈ B n satisfy E P (Bn) X C n (X) ≤ n+1 n b . Assume otherwise that there exists B * n ∈ B n such that E P (B * n ) X C n (X) > n+1 n b . Then, we can write
where (a) is because by the expurgation procedure, E P (Bn ) X C n (X) ≥ E P (B * n ) X C n (X) for every B n ∈ B n \ B n ;
(b) is sinceμ(B n \ B n ) ≥ n n+1 . Eqn. (36) contradicts (34a), and hence E P (Bn )
Define a PMF µ 1 ∈ P(B n ) and its induced probability measureμ 1 on B n by
respectively. Then, we have
2) Codebook expurgation to satisfy average cost, average error probability and semantic-security:
Expurgate codebooks B n ∈ B n with the highest average error probability to obtain a set B n ⊂ B n such that
Then, it follows similarly to step 1 that
Define another PMF µ 2 ∈ P(B n ) by
Then, we have
Perform one more expurgation step similar to the previous step to obtain a non-empty set of codebooks B n such that for each codebook B n ∈ B n and sufficiently large n,
3) Message expurgation to satisfy per-message cost, maximal error probability and semantic-security:
Now, fixing a codebook B n ∈ B n , perform expurgation on the set of messages M n to obtain upper bounds on the per-message cost and maximal error probability, in place of the average (over messages) cost and average (over messages) error probability given in (37) and (38) , respectively. Let α ∈ [ 1 n+2 , 1 n+1 ). Similar to step 1, by expurgating a (1 − α) fraction of the messages m ∈ M n with the highest cost E P (Bn ) X|M (·|m) C n (X) to obtain a set M n ⊂ M n , and defining for all (m, i, j, u, v, x, y, z,m) ∈ M n ×I n ×J n ×U n ×V n ×X n ×Y n ×Z n ×M n , a PMFP (Bn) given bỹ 
it follows that
Finally, for β ∈ [ 
Summary of expurgation steps:
Note that |M n | = βα|M n | ≥ e nR 3(n+2) . Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have shown the existence of a codebook B n and a (n, R − 1 n log(3n + 6)) code c n (B n ) = (f n , g n ) with message set M n , such that
and max max m∈M n e m (c n (B n )) , max Since the WTC transition kernel is P Y,Z|XZ = P Y |X,Z 1 {Z=Z} , Z =Z with probability one. We henceforth identify Z andZ. We start by showing that max P U,V,X ∈H(0.5)
Set U =Z ∼ Ber(0.5),X ∼ Ber(0.5),X ⊥ ⊥Z, and V = X = (X,Z). This choice satisfies P U,V,X ∈ H(0.5),
and E P C(X) := E P Z = 0.5. Moreover,
where (43) is because I P (X; Y |Z) = PZ(1)H(X) = 0.5. Hence, (42) holds.
Next, we establish that max P V,X : E P [C(X)]≤0.5
For any P V,X = P V,X,Z such that E P Z ≤ 0.5, we have the following chain of inequalities 4 :
where, (a) is due to the Markov chain V − (X,Z) − (Y,Z);
(b) follows from the definition of Y ;
(c) is because N ⊥ ⊥ (X,Z);
(d) uses the cost constraint E Z ≤ 0.5;
(e) is by the non-negativity of mutual information and since Y is binary.
Consequently, (44) is violated only if there exists some X = (X,Z) and a joint PMF P V,X,Y,Z = P V,X P Y,Z|X such that E Z ≤ 0.5, and the inequalities in (45) and (46) hold with equality, i.e.,
For this to be possible, the following conditions must hold:
1) PZ(1) = 0.5;
2) H(Y |Z = 1) = 1 which means that givenZ = 1, Y ∼ Ber(0.5); 
The inequality in (49) is due to Condition (3) above, while the last equality is due to Condition (2). Since Y is binary, I(V ; Y |Z = 1) ≤ 1, and therefore the inequality in (49) is an equality.
To conclude, observe that (V, Y ) ⊥ ⊥Z (shown above) implies that
However, I(V ; Y ) − I(V ;Z) ≤ 0.5 from (46). This leads to a contradiction, and so (48) is invalid. Via (47) , this implies that (44) holds. Combining (44) with (42) proves Proposition 9.
C. Proof of Corollary 10
Fix P U,V,X,Y,Z = P U,V P X|V P Y,Z|X , where Y is less noisy than Z. We have Thus, it follows thatC
The reverse inequality follows trivially by selecting V = X and U = ∅ in (16), thus proving (19) .
If Z is less noisy than Y , then I P (V ; Y |U ) − I P (V ; Z|U ) ≤ 0 for any P U,V,X,Y,Z = P U,V P X|V P Y,Z|X which givesC(b) = 0, due to its non-negativity.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper revisited the classical WTC setting with a cost constraint, and showed that achieving its secrecy- 
P Ui,Vi,Xi,Yi,Zi := P Ui,Vi,Xi P Yi,Zi|Xi := P Ui,Vi,Xi P Y,Z|X ,
Also, let τ ∈ [0, 1], Q ∼ Ber(τ ) with Q = {0, 1}, U τ := (U Q , Q), V τ := (V Q , Q) and X τ := X Q , and P Uτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ,Yτ ,Zτ ∈ P(U τ × V τ × X × Y × Z) be a PMF defined by P Uτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ,Yτ ,Zτ := P Uτ ,Vτ P Xτ |Vτ P Yτ ,Zτ |Xτ := P Uτ ,Vτ P Xτ |Vτ P Y,Z|X .
Note that U τ − V τ − X τ − (Y τ , Z τ ) holds under P Uτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ,Yτ ,Zτ , and P Uτ ,Vτ ,Xτ ∈ H(τ b 0 + (1 − τ )b 1 ) since
which establishes the concavity ofC(·).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 11
The proof is standard, however, we provide it for completeness. Let P (µ) (·) := E µ P (Bn) (·) and P P (µ) denote the random coding PMF and its induced probability measure, respectively. Also, define where ν u,v,y denotes the empirical PMF of (u, v, y) ∈ U n × V n × Y n . Note that for δ > 0 and n sufficiently large, ζ (n) 1 (δ) > 0 . First, consider the probability of the error event E 1 (1, 1, 1) averaged over the random codebook B n . We have E µ P P (Bn) E 1 (1, 1, 1) (I, J, M ) = (1, 1, 1) = P P (µ) U(1), V (1, 1, 1 
where the inequality in (56) follows from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.6 in [50] .
Next, we analyze the probability of the error event E 2 (1, 1, 1) averaged over B n . Note that for (j, m) = (1, 1)
and sufficiently large n, P P (µ) U(1), V(1, j, m), Y ∈ T This implies that for δ sufficiently small and n large enough, there exists ζ 2 (δ) > 0 such that E µ P P (Bn) E 2 (1, 1, 1) (I, J, M ) = (1, 1, 1) ≤ e −nζ2(δ) −→ n 0,
provided (25) holds.
Finally, consider the third error event E 3 (1, 1, 1) . We have for i = 1 and sufficiently large n that P P (µ) U(i), V(i, j, m), Y ∈ T Thus, it follows that for δ sufficiently small and n large enough, there exists ζ 3 (δ) > 0 such that E µ P P (Bn) E 3 (1, 1, 1) (I, J, M ) = (1, 1, 1) ≤ e −nζ3(δ) −→ n 0,
provided (26) holds. The claim in the lemma follows from (56), (57) and (58) via the union bound on probability applied to the left hand side of (27) .
